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THE CLOSE CORPORATION COMES OF AGE IN
PENNSYLVANIA: ARTICLE III, CHAPTER B OF
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
With the approval of S. B. No. 11691 on July 20, 1968, Penn-
sylvania joined those states which have enacted legislation specifi-
cally tailored to the close corporation. Among its amendments this
bill added chapter B, entitled "Close Corporations" to article III of
the existing Business Corporation Law.2 Chapter B, together with
a new section 613.13 concerning stock transfer restrictions, should
enable qualifying corporations to operate in an atmosphere more
akin to their particular needs. This Comment will analyze the
theoretical background and the probable construction these pro-
visions will have in an aid to their understanding and interpre-
tation. The major emphasis will be on Pennsylvania cases con-
struing the former law and statutory changes made by chapter B
of which the practitioner should be aware.
Most lawyers probably recognize the term close corporation as
describing a business enterprise which, though in corporate form,
is operated as a partnership with only a few shareholders. Pro-
fessor O'Neal, in his treatise on the subject, notes that the term
"close corporation" is often used to distinguish the corporation
with a few shareholders from the "public issue" or publicly held
corporation. 4 He views the close corporation as one with few stock-
holders whose shares are not generally traded in the securities
market. Its attributes are: (1) the shareholders are few in num-
ber and often only two or three; (2) they usually live in the same
geographical area, know each other and are well acquainted with
each other's business skills; (3) all or most of the shareholders are
active in the business and usually serve as directors or officers; and
(4) little or no trading takes place in the shares as there is no estab-
lished market for the corporate stock which is usually not listed on
a stock exchange or actively dealt with by brokers.5 Although
1. Act of July 20, 1968, Act No. 216, P.L. - (S.B. No. 1169) (3 PuR-
DON'S PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE SERVICE 424 (1968) ) (hereinafter cited 1968
Amendments. PUaDON'S citations shall be as found in the LEGISLATIVE
SERVICE pamphlet). The act is effective August 19, 1968.
2. Business Corporation Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (1967)
(hereinafter cited BCL.) See 39 PA. BAR Assoc. Q. 259 (1968).
3. 1968 Amendments § 1613.1. The Pennsylvania statutory amend-
ments in this area are substantially similar to Delaware's close corporation
provisions, DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (Supp. 1968).
4. 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1-02 (1958)
(hereinafter cited O'NEAL).
5. Id. § 1.07.
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there are no reliable figures showing what percentage of companies
have these attributes, the great majority of corporations in this
country would qualify.6 Yet most corporation statutes were drafted
with the publicly held corporation in mind.7 In many states the
closely held corporation was often at a statutory disadvantage com-
pared to a publicly-held one. A movement for legislative relief
resulted."
Recently, several states9 have modified their corporation laws
to deal specifically with the closely-held corporation. Two, Mary-
land 0 and Florida,1 enacted separate close corporation statutes.
This legislation has secured for statutorily defined close corporations
an express legislative right to impose stock transfer restrictions.
Furthermore, such statutes provide for shareholder pre-emptive
rights and shareholder management through shareholder agree-
ment. This gives the small, closely-held corporation the flexibility
and informality of the partnership.
Among the more significant changes made by such legislation
is the power to regulate the affairs of the corporation and the
relationships of the shareholders directly by agreement.12 This is
similar to the power allowed partnerships which permits them to
operate their business by agreement. While each partner has some
6. Id. § 1.02.
7. Id. § 1.13. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corpora-
tion-The Need For More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145
(1966); Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MICH.
L. REV. 273 (1929).
8. See, e.g., Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law,"
28 CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1943); Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Cor-
poration-The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145
(1966); Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Sep-
arate Treatment, 12 HAST. L.J. 227 (1961); Powers, Cross Fire on the Close
Corporation: Norms verses Needs, 11 FLA. L. REV. 433 (1958); Note, Statu-
tory Assistance for Closely Held Corporations, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1498 (1958);
Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation,
33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 700 (1958).
9. Some states have modified their corporation statutes to deal with
problems of the close corporation. Aside from those peculiar to the one-
man corporation they are: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (Supp. 1968);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.15 (1964); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 702(a)
(Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1 to 55-175 (Supp. 1955); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 12-11.1 to 12-31.2 (Supp. 1966); and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1371-386
(3 Purdon's PA. LEG. SER. 1968).
10. ANN. CODE MD. Art. 23, § 100-11 (Supp. 1967). For an analysis of
the Maryland statute see Hall, The New Maryland Close Corporation Law,
27 MD. L. REV. 341 (1967).
11. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.0100-608.0107 (Supp. 1968).
12. For an exponent of this view, see Hall, The New Maryland
Close Corporation Law, 27 MD. L. REV. 314, 342 (1967).
voice in the running of the business the actual operation of the
partnership may be often subject to agreement. 1 3 Furthermore, in
a partnership informality prevails. Instead of being limited by
statutory requirements for annual meetings of shareholders' ap-
proval validating director-made commitments, partners may pro-
vide by agreement for the management of the business as their
particular needs or fancies dictate, thereby enjoying the fullest
freedom of contract. 14 In short, the proponents of close corpora-
tion legislation desired a single business form which would add
to the corporate insulation from personal liability the advantages
of partnership. 15
In Pennsylvania, corporations generally found the language of
the BCL sufficiently broad so as to enable the closely-held cor-
poration to operate within its framework. The courts were aware
of the distinctive characteristics of close corporations and accorded
them treatment different from that given corporations publicly
held.1 6 The result was to overcome-through liberal judicial inter-
pretation of the corporation statutes-the inherent disadvantages
which would have followed if a stricter interpretation applied to
closely-held corporations. Often, however, the spirit as well as
the letter of the law was stretched to reach this result. Mean-
while, other sister states, notably Delaware, enacted legislation
which dealt specifically with the needs of the close corporation. In
a move to keep current with more progressive states with respect
to developing corporation law, Pennsylvania enacted chapter B to
article III of the BCL.
CLOSE CORPORATION PROVISIONS OF THE BCL
A. Formation
The definition section of the 1968 amendments to the BCL pro-
vides:
Close corporation means a business corporation which
has elected to become subject to Chapter B of Article III
of this Act and whose status as a close corporation has
not been terminated as provided in such Chapter.1
7
13. Uniform Partnership Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 31 (1964).
14. Id. § 51 (1964).
15. See, e.g., Bradley, Toward A More Perfect Close Corporation-The
Need For More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1148-1150.
16. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Geahry, 360 Pa. 376, 61 A.2d 843 (1948) (presi-
dent of closely-held corporation was compelled to specifically perform con-
tract in which he promised to sell a specified number of shares in the corpo-
ration. Purchaser's remedy at law was inadequate because stock in a close
corporation is of peculiar value and such stock is not purchasable nor does
it have a readily ascertainable value on the open market) and notes
69-72 infra.
17. 1968 Amendments § 1002(4).
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For a corporation to take advantage of close corporation status
it must elect to do so. New corporations may elect close corpora-
tion status by placing in their articles of incorporation a heading
stating that it is a close corporation. 8 For existing business cor-
porations, section 374 provides that they may make their election
by filing articles of amendment with a statement that they have
elected to become a close corporation."
The changes made by the chapter B provisions relating to the
formation and procedural modification of business corporations re-
quire that care be exercised by existing corporations wishing to
become a statutory close corporation in Pennsylvania. Such a cor-
poration must insure that a sufficient percentage of affirmative
votes approve the amendment to the existing articles.
There is an increase in the percentage of votes necessary for
approval of an amendment to the articles to elect to become a close
corporation.20 Unless the articles themselves required a greater
vote, the BCL required only a majority to adopt an amendment to
the articles. To approve an amendment so as to become a close cor-
poration, a two-thirds affirmative vote is required.21 Further-
more, there is an additional change in the voting restrictions con-
cerning those entitled to vote on the proposed close corporation
amendment to the articles. Formerly, the articles of a business
corporation could restrict those holders of outstanding shares who
would be entitled to vote on amendments to articles of incorpora-
tion.22 If there is a proposed amendment seeking close corporation
status, however, the holders of every class shall be entitled to vote
regardless of any limitations stated in the articles on the voting
rights of any class.
-3
Probably the most crucial provision dealing with procedural
18. Id. § 1373.
19. Id. § 1374.
20. The general procedure for amendment to articles is specified in
article VIII of the BCL.
21. 1968 Amendments § 1373B(1).
22. BCL § 1804. But see, Shaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486,
88 A.2d 277 (1952), where the court did not allow a general reservation to
amend the by-laws to be construed to permit amendments which would
alter or repeal property or contract rights. Thus the court would not com-
pel dissenting owner of shares of preferred stock of a business corporation
to accept common stock in exchange for his holding with loss of his right
to the then accrued, cumulative, undeclared and unpaid dividends.
23. 1968 Amendments § 1372; Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367
Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951) (repeal by a majority stock vote of bylaws of
the company which imposed restrictions on the right of shareholders to
sell the company's stock was invalid).
steps to become a close corporation is section 372.24 This section
defines and limits those corporations which may enjoy close corpo-
ration status. It provides that, in addition to the election state-
ment in either the articles of incorporation or in the articles of
amendment, three distinct requirements must be met: (1) the num-
ber of persons holding shares of record shall not exceed 30; (2) all
of the issued shares of all classes shall be subject to a stock re-
striction; and (3) the corporation shall make no public offering of
its shares within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933.25
Of the three requirements, the numerical limit to thirty share-
holders seems most open to criticism. There is precedent for
limiting the number of shareholders at 30; both Delaware and
Maryland have limited to 30 the maximum shareholders allowed a
corporation in order to qualify as a close corporation. 26 But this
provision has been criticized as arbitrary which is apparent when
the addition of but one shareholder of record will disqualify the
corporation as a close corporation. Thirty-one shareholders should
not change the nature of the corporation as would happen, for ex-
ample, with the public trading of shares. The additional require-
ment of no public offering while it does not erase the arbitrariness
does bring the definition in accord with the linguistic usage of the
legal profession.
2 7
The second requirement, that each share must be subject to a
transfer restriction, signals a statutory shift in the law respecting
stock transfer restrictions. While Pennsylvania courts allowed
reasonable stock restrictions 28 they were viewed with disfavor
and, though not necessarily invalid, they were construed strictly.2 9
24. 1968 Amendments § 1372.
25. Federal Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15
U.S.C.A. 77a-77aa (1963). In United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp.,
247 F. Supp. 481 (D. Md. 1965), aff'd, 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967), a sale
was made to "associates" of unregistered stock under the private offering
exception. The court said:
The test adopted to determine what is public and what is pri-
vate is whether the offeree is able to fend for himself and, if not
able to fend for himself so that the offering becomes public, it
makes no difference whether the offerees are few or many.
Id. at 489; accord, S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). The
Ralston Purina court explained that ability to fend for oneself was to have
access to types of information that would be made available by a regis-
tration statement.
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (Supp. 1968); ANN. CODE MD. Art. 23,
§ 100-11 (Supp. 1967).
27. 1 O'NEAL, § 1.02.
28. Beggy v. Deike, 413 Pa. 74, 196 A.2d 179 (1963); Bechtold v. Cole-
man Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951); Halkias v. Liberty Laun-
dry Co., 361 Pa. 475, 64 A.2d 800 (1949); Garvin's Estate, 335 Pa. 542, 6
A.2d 796 (1939); Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78
(1909); Fitzsimmons v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 A. 488 (1903); see generally,
23 U. PITT. L. REV. 969 (1962); Note, 63 DicK. L. REV. 265 (1959).
29. See, e.g., Trilling v. Montague, 140 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1956);




At least one Pennsylvania lower court held a consent restraint void
because the effect of the agreement was to put the stockholder's
power to sell his stock in the hands of and make it dependent upon
the will of others.30 Another court held a pre-incorporation agree-
ment between the incorporators whereby parties thereto would not
sell or assign any stock issued by the corporation except to each
other illegal and unenforceable as being against public policy.
This was so, said the court, even though there was a provision for
the stock certificates to have a notation of the restriction since
the result was a permanent restriction on alienation of property.3 '
What restriction was "reasonable" and therefore "valid" depended
on ad hoc judicial interpretation. Those drafting such restrictions
in corporate articles had only case law for reference. Section 372
(2), however, expressly provides: "All of the issued shares of all
classes shall be subject to one or more of the restrictions on transfer
permitted by Section 613.1 of this act; .... 32 That the legislature
intends there must be stock transfer restrictions is emphasized
since the mandatory shall is used, not merely a permissive may.
Section 613.1 is new. At least one of the following restrictions
must be placed on each share of stock of the close corporation:
(1) a "first option" restriction;
38
(2) an "agreement to purchase" restriction;
3 4
(3) a "prior consent or approval" restriction;35 or
(4) a "reasonable prohibition of transfer" restriction.3 6
30. White v. Ryan, 15 County Ct. 170 (Pa. C. P. 1894).
31. In re Haase's Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 106 (C.P. 1962); accord,
Dearden v. Dearden, 360 Pa. 225, 61 A.2d 348 (1948).
32. 1968 Amendments § 1372 (emphasis added). Note that section
613.1 is also a new section added by S.B. 1169 in conjunction with chapter
B's provisions. Id. § 1613.1.
33. Id. § 1613.1C(1). This section obligates the holder of the restricted
securities to offer to the corporation or to any other holders of securities
of the corporation or to any other person or to any combination of the fore-
going, a prior opportunity, to be exercised within a reasonable time, to
acquire the restricted securities.
34. Id. § 1613.1C(2). This section obligates the corporation or any
holder of securities of the corporation or any other person or any combina-
tion of the foregoing, to purchase the securities which are the subject of
an agreement respecting the purchase and sale of the restricted securities.
35. Id. § 1613.1C (3). This section requires the corporation or the
holders of any class of securities of the corporation to consent to any
proposed transfer of the restricted securities or to approve the proposed
transferee of the restricted securities.
36. Id. § 1613.1C(4). This section prohibits the transfer of the re-
stricted securities to designated persons or classes of persons, and such
designation is not manifestly unreasonable. It is to be noted that § 1613.1D
provides that a restriction placed on the transfer of shares for the purpose
of maintaining Subchapter S status is conclusively presumed to be for a
reasonable purpose.
While it would appear that any one or all of the four restrictions
may be imposed, a draftsman is not limited to them. He may place
on the shares any other lawful restriction.37 Thus an opening is
left for counsel ingenuity to draft in a manner to suit the needs of
his client.
As to the mechanics of placing a restriction on shares the sec-
tion states that a stock transfer restriction may be imposed by any
of three methods: (1) by agreement, (2) in the by-laws; or (3) in
the articles.38 This clarifies any question as to whether restrictions
in the articles would be invalid.30 It is also clear that with respect
to securities issued prior to the adoption of the restrictions, they
shall not be binding unless the holders of the securities are parties
to the agreement or voted in favor of them.
40
The "teeth" of the stock transfer restrictions is the enforce-
ment rights which accrue to the corporation or other shareholders.
If the restriction is one of the four noted above and is conspicuously
written on the security it may be enforced against the holder.41
Unless so noted, however, the restriction, even if permitted is in-
effective except as against a person with actual knowledge of the
restriction.42
These enforcement provisions, however, must be read in con-
junction with section 377. It enumerates presumptions which shall
be made whenever there is an issuance or transfer of shares of a
close corporation in breach of the restrictions. 43 Armed with these
37. Id. § 1613.1E.
38. Id. § 1613.1B.
39. See, e.g., Note, 63 DIcK. L. REv. 265, 274 (1959).
40. 1968 Amendments § 1613.1B.
41. Id. § 1613.1A. A holder includes an executor, administrator, trus-
tee, guardian or other fiduciary entrusted with like responsibility for the
person or estate of the holder.
42. Id. The requirement that unless noted conspicuously on the
security, the restriction is ineffective except against a person with actual
knowledge thereof is consistent with the rule of the Uniform Commercial
Code, tit. 12A PA. STAT. ANN. § 8-204 (Supp. 1967): Effect of Issuer's Re-
strictions on Transfer. Unless noted conspicuously on the security a restric-
tion on transfer imposed by the issuer even though otherwise lawful is
ineffective except against a person with actual knowledge of it. See
Perugino v. Sampson Land & Development Co., 39 D. & C.2d 500 (1966).
43. Id. § 1377. This section has reference to the presumed notice of
the transferees of the restricted shares. Thus, Section 377A provides that
if shares are issued or transferred to any person who is not entitled
under any provision of the articles (in subsection B of section 372) to be a
holder of record and, if this is conspicuously noted on the certificate, such
person shall be conclusively presumed to have notice of his ineligibility to
be a holder. Subsection 377B provides that if the articles state the number
of persons, not in excess of thirty, who are entitled to be holders of record
of its shares and the certificates conspicuously notes this and if the issu-
ance or transfer would cause the number to be exceeded then the person for
whom such shares are issued or transferred shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to have notice of this fact. Subsection 377C states that if a
share certificate conspicuously notes the existence of any of the permitted
transfer restrictions on the shares of the corporation, then the transferee
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
presumptions, one wishing to enforce the restrictions should be
able to maintain close corporation status.
B. Pre-emptive Rights of Shareholders
A close corporation acquires certain rights by reason of its close
corporation status. One arises under section 379,44 concerning pre-
emptive rights. Under this section, holders of any class of voting
shares in a qualifying close corporation have a pre-emptive right of
subscription or purchase of any voting shares issued or sold by the
corporation. The pre-emptive right is not limited to merely voting
shares; the section also speaks of any "option rights" or "securities
having conversion or option rights" for "any form of consideration."
Furthermore, treasury shares are expressly included as being sub-
ject to a pre-emptive right.4" Thus section 379 reinstates for close
corporation shareholders, the common law rule granting share-
holders the privilege to purchase pro-rata new issues of stock prior
to their being offered to others.46 This rule appears designed to pro-
tect the existing shareholders' proportionate voting power and pro-
portionate interest in corporate earnings and assets.
In corporations other than close corporations, however, pro-
tecting shareholders' proportionate interests may be less important
than the corporation's need for additional cash.47 Under the BCL
prior to the 1968 amendments the burden was on the draftsmen
of corporate articles to especially provide for a right of pre-
emption:
Unless otherwise provided in its articles, a business
corporation may issue shares, option rights or securities
having conversion or option rights, without first offering
them to shareholders of any class or classes.48
The manner in which the courts interpreted the above rule is illus-
shall be conclusively presumed to have notice of this fact, if such acquisi-
tion violates the restriction. Id. at § 1337. This section also gives a cor-
poration an option to refuse to register a transfer in breach. Id. § 1337D.
And it covers the situation as to gifts or devises since the term "transfer,"
as it is used in the section, is not limited to a transfer for value. Id.
§ 1377F.
44. 1968 Amendments § 1379.
45. See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
46. 11 Fletcher § 5135 at 279 (1958); Reading Trust Co. v. Reading
Iron Works, 137 Pa. 282, 21 A. 119 (1890).
47. See 1 O'NEAL, § 3.39.
48. BCL § 1611. The revised version of § 1611 as amended in 1968
now reads: Pre-emptive Rights of Shareholders-A. Except as otherwise
provided in subsection B of this section or in its articles, a business cor-
poration may issue shares, option rights or securities having conversion or
trated by two cases. In Provident Trust Co. v. Crouse49 a corpora-
tion was composed entirely of the members of two familes. A sale
of treasury shares to certain officers of the corporation had been
authorized by the shareholders. The board of directors and plain-
tiffs, as shareholders, sought to prevent the sale. Plaintiffs based
their case on the common law pre-emptive right of a shareholder
to subscribe to unissued stock. The court, citing section 611 of the
BCL, said that unless provided in the articles (in this case there
was no evidence of any such provision) the shareholders of a busi-
ness corporation do not have pre-emptive rights with respect to any
class of shares. 50 Again, in Christman v. Anvil's, Inc."1 there was
no provision in the articles granting pre-emptive rights to the
shareholders. But there was such a provision in the by-laws.
Nevertheless, the court held to the strict rule that since the
statute required that a provision must be in the articles, the pro-
vision in the by-laws was effective.52 Now, under section 376, simply
being a close corporation gives the shareholders a pre-emptive right.
Nothing need be said in an agreement, in the by-laws or in the
articles.
C. Validity of Agreements to Elect Directors
The right to control voting by agreement is provided for in
section 381.11 It states that a written agreement among share-
holders of a close corporation entitled to cast at least a majority
of the votes which all shareholders are entitled to cast in the elec-
tion of directors, whether solely among themselves or with a party
not a shareholder, "is not invalid . . . on the ground that it so re-
lates to the conduct of the business and affairs of the corporation
as to restrict or interfere with the discretion of powers of the
board of directors. ' 54  Therefore voting agreements will not be
invalid on the ground that such are contrary to public policy or
the provision in section 401 5 of the BCL. That section required
option rights, without first offering them to shareholders of any class or
classes. 1968 Amendments § 1611A. The words in italics are new and
would seem to be a further extension allowing pre-emption rights to
shareholders to those other than the statutory close corporation. Sub-
section B refers to unlisted corporations.
49. 40 Pa. D. & C. 628 (C.P. 1941).
50. Id. at 630. There is language in the opinion which would lead
one to believe that this court would not extend pre-emptive rights to
treasury shares: "Furthermore, it has been generally held that pre-emp-
tive rights do not extend to treasury shares." Id.
51. 80 Pa. D. & C. 395 (C.P. 1952).
52. Id. at 408. The court in dictum said that not only was the by-
law restriction ineffective but that an agreement between the stockholders
would be ineffective also.
53. 1968 Amendments § 1381.
54. Id.
55. BCL § 1401. In the 1968 amendments the only change in the
language of the first sentence of Section 401 is the deletion that there must
be at least three directors: The business and affairs of every business
Comments
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that the business and affairs of every business corporation be man-
aged by a board of directors. Such a public policy attack was
made on a pooling agreement in Baran v. Baran.56 There three
sole shareholders of a corporation agreed in writing to vote for one
another as directors and officers at specified salaries for a certain
number of years. Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance
on the written contract; defendant contended the contract was un-
enforceable on the grounds that it was against public policy. The
court, agreeing with plaintiff that the meaning of the term "public
policy" is vague and uncertain, held that the contract was not
against public policy. It looked to the purpose of the voting agree-
ment before it decreed specific performance reasoning that:
It is not in violation of any rule or principle of law
for stockholders, who own a majority of the stock in a
corporation, to cause its affairs to be managed in such way
as they may think best calculated to further the ends of
the corporation and for this purpose to appoint one or
more proxies, who shall vote in such a way as will carry
out their plans. Nor is it against public policy for two or
more stockholders to agree upon a course of corporate ac-
tion, or upon the officers whom they will elect. .... 17
While section 381 expressly recognizes that such voting agree-
ments will not be invalid on the ground that they interfere with
the director's discretion, the courts probably will still look to the
purposes of the agreements before requiring specific performance.
A draftsman of such agreements would do well to state the purpose
for the voting agreements expressly and in detail since their validity
may hinge on the purposes thus stated. 58
The effect of a pooling agreement is not open to conjecture; it
relieves the directors but imposes upon the shareholders who are
parties to the agreement, the liability for managerial acts or
omissions imposed by law on directors for as long as the discretion
and powers of the board are controlled by it."
corporation shall be managed by a board of directors, who shall be natural
persons of full age, and who need not be residents of this Commonwealth
or shareholders in the corporation, unless the articles or by-laws so re-
quire. 1968 Amendments § 1401.
56. 59 Pa. D. & C. 556 (C.P. 1947).
57. Id. at 558. Contra, Dubbs v. Kramer, 302 Pa. 455, 153 A. 757
(1931) (contract invalid made by director of a corporation that limits or
restricts him in the free exercise of his discretion), cf., Deibler v. Charles H.
Elliott Co., 368 Pa. 267, 81 A.2d 557 (1951) (irrevocable proxy held valid
which in effect controlled directors' discretion).
58. For suggestions as to purposes held valid in other jurisdictions,
see 1 'NEAL, § 5.08.
59. 1968 Amendments § 1381. See note 75 infra and accompanying
text.
D. Operating the Close Corporation as a Partnership
The usual rule is that businessmen who incorporate must con-
sistently conduct their enterprise as a corporation. They cannot
revert whenever they so desire to partnership practices in the man-
agement of the business or in their relationships among them-
selves.60 In Pennsylvania this rule was enunciated in Schuster
v. Largman.61 There four partners, Schuster, Grey and two Larg-
man brothers, agreed to form a corporation for the purpose of
manufacturing hosiery. In the agreement Schuster was to man-
age the manufacturing branch of the business. Of the 1000 shares
to be issued, Schuster was to have 30 shares, Grey, 200 shares and
the balance to the Largmans. All were to be directors. Grey
subsequently left the business and sold his shares to the Largmans.
The Largmans, by virtue of their majority control, dominated the
corporation's activities and interfered with Schuster's manage-
ment of the manufacturing business. They terminated Schuster's
employment by a vote of the "board." He brought an action in
equity as an aggrieved member of a "partnership" excluded from
his rightful participation in the business. The court refused to
aid him, saying:
The division of managerial authority in the case now
before us, whereby plaintiff [Schuster] is to manage the
manufacturing branch of the business, does not negative
control of the entire corporate business by the board of
directors. Plaintiff would have us strip the defendant
corporation of its corporate habiliments and make it stand
unmasked as a partnership.
62
The court seemed unwilling to find in the agreement itself a means
by which it could come to the aid of one of the parties to enforce
contractual rights. Although the parties were operating under
the corporate form, they had an agreement which to all appear-
ances was intended to allow management of the business as a
partnership, at the same time providing protection for each part-
60. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910); Manacher v.
Central Coal Co., 284 App. Div. 380, 131 N.Y.S.2d 671 (lst Dept. 1954), aff'd
mem., 308 N.Y. 784, 125 N.E.2d 431 (1955); Seity v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80,
181 N.W. 102 (1921); but see, Beardsley v. Beardsley, 138 U.S. 262 (1891);
Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg. Corp., 326 Mass. 226, 93 N.E.2d 537 (1950);
Hathaway v. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 296 Mich. 90, 295 N.W. 571 (1941).
61. 308 Pa. 520, 162 A. 305 (1932).
62. Id. at 530, 162 A. at 308. The court quoted with approval Jackson
v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1930) where that court observed that
it was contrary to sound policy to permit
persons engaged in business as partners . . . [to] incorporate,
with intent to obtain the advantages and immunities of a corporate
form, and then, Proteus-like become at will a copartnership or a
corporation, as the exigencies or purposes of their joint enter-
prise may from time to time require .... If they adopt the cor-
porate form, with the corporate shield extended over them to pro-
tect them against personal liability, they cease to be partners,
and have only the rights, duties, and obligations of shareholders.
Id. at 59, 75 A. at 571. See 1 O'NEAL § 5.05.
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ner's interest. The court, however, disregarded the agreement and
held the parties bound to corporate formalities. Schuster's argu-
ment that the agreement and his rights thereunder would be
breached if corporate formalities were strictly followed was for the
court not determinative.
The above Rule is now changed by the 1968 amendment. The
combined effect of sections 38263 and 38564 is that a close corporation
may operate as a partnership. For example, section 382 eliminates
the requirement for a board of directors. It states that "the articles
of a close corporation may provide that the business and affairs of
the corporation shall be managed by the shareholders of the corpo-
ration rather than by a board of directors."65 This abrogates the
prior rule that the right of an individual stockholder to act for a
corporation is exceptional and arises only on a clear showing of
special circumstances such as the corporation's inability or un-
willingness to act, a demand on the regular corporate management
to act, or a refusal by it to act.66
The relaxation of strict corporate formalities is underscored
further in section 382(1):67 if a corporation is managed by share-
holders "no meeting need be called to elect directors. '6 Penn-
sylvania courts were not unaware of the need for a relaxation of
the strict formalities of the BCL as it applied to closely held cor-
porations. In Miller v. South Hills Lumber & Supply Co.,69 for
example, the corporate formalities of the BCL were not strictly
adhered to in upholding the validity of an agreement entered into
by shareholder-directors. There a creditor of a corporation com-
posed of only three shareholders one of whom owned 1,200 of the
1,210 shares outstanding was induced to give up preferred status in
exchange for the corporation's written agreement, signed by the
president and treasurer, to protect the creditor against loss. There
was evidence the agreement was executed upon formal action of
the directors, but the entry of this action upon the minutes had been
neglected by the secretary. The court, in holding that the corpo-
ration was bound stated that:
63. 1968 Amendments § 1382.
64. Id. § 1385.
65. Id. § 1382. Counsel should note especially that if the articles
contain such a provision, the existence of it must be noted conspicuously on
the face or back of every share certificate issued by the corporation. Id.
66. McCloskey v. Snowden, 212 Pa. 249, 61 A. 796 (1903) (refusal to
act must be a breach of trust to enable shareholder to act for a corpora-
tion).
67. 1968 Amendments § 1382(1).
68. Id.
69. 334 Pa. 293, 6 A.2d 92 (1939).
where the corporation is a close one, as here, strict ad-
herence to corporate formalities is not always required;
establishment of the action of directors is not confined to
proof of the minutes, and informal action may be ratified
by appropriate corporate recognition of its earlier action.
. . . Here, though the minutes were neglected, it is suffi-
cient that a formal meeting was held at which unanimous
approval and recognition were accorded to appellant's
claim.
70
And, in Chambers v. Beaver-Advance Corporation7 1 a board of di-
rectors passed a resolution without stockholder approval for pay-
ment of a bonus to corporate officers for past services. There was
no formal ratification of these bonuses by the stockholders at the
time. Two years later a resolution was passed by a majority of
the stockholders approving the directors prior action. The court
said the acts of the board of directors approving the payment of
bonuses for the prior years to corporate officers were voidable
rather than void; when thereafter the resolution was approved by a
majority of the stockholders it became valid. As to the lack of
corporate formalities, the court said:
[A] very small or closed corporation is not held to the
strict formalities that are applicable to large corporations,
especially where the members of the board of directors
personally conduct and actively direct the business.
72
The language of section 382 gives a statutory basis for informal
operation of the corporation. With shareholder management ex-
pressly provided for, many of the problems associated with a
breach of the formalities of directors' action in the close corpora-
tion should be minimized. If the articles clearly provide for share-
holder management, such acts should bind the corporation yet not
thereby attach personal liability.
Section 38573 is a corollary provision to 382 allowing for oper-
ation of the close corporation as a partnership. While section 381
removes the restriction on alienation objection from voting agree-
ments, the provisions of section 385 allow for agreements among
shareholders pertaining to the management of the business itself.
70. Id. at 298-99, 6 A.2d at 95, see also, Sharon Herald v. Granger, 97
F. Supp. 295 (W.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd on other grounds, 195 F.2d 890 (3d Cir.
1952); McCay v. Luzerne & Carbon County Motor Transport Co., 125 Pa.
Super. 217, 189 A. 772 (1937) (dictum). The motor transport company in
the McCay case has had its ups and downs and has figured in much of
the development of the case law on Pennsylvania closely held corpora-
tions, see footnotes 65 and 57 supra; Baran v. Baran, 166 Pa. Super. 532,
72 A.2d 623 (1950) for other cases concerning this company.
71. 392 Pa. 481, 140 A.2d 808 (1958).
72. Id. at 492, 140 A.2d at 814. See also, Mickshaw v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., Inc., 166 Pa. Super. 148, 70 A.2d 467 (1950) (well known that
corporations which include few stockholders do not often act with as much
formality as large companies); Elliott v. Lindquist, 356 Pa. 385, 52 A.2d 180
(1947) (shareholders held to have waived right to object and informal
action of directors ratified by custom and shareholder acquiescence).
73. 1968 Amendments § 1385.
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This section does not expressly validate such written agreements; it
merely provides that no written agreement among shareholders,
provisions in the articles or in the by-laws shall be invalid on the
ground that it is an attempt by the parties to treat the corporation
as if it were a partnership.
Profit of small corporations often is taken in the form of sal-
aries rather than dividends. A minority shareholder, in the absence
of agreement, may be excluded by the majority from a salaried
officer position. The shareholder agreement can protect the minor-
ity shareholder by providing, among other things, that he shall be a
director and an officer at a specified salary. Section 385 will now
allow for such shareholder agreements.
Rather than leave the purposes of these agreements to inter-
pretation, the section sets forth certain examples of those types of
agreements which will not be invalid simply because they could be
construed as an attempt by the shareholders to operate the corpo-
ration as a partnership. Among them are: (1) management of the
business; (2) declaration and payment of dividends or other division
of profits; (3) election of directors or officers; (4) employment of
shareholders by the corporation; and (5) the arbitration of dis-
putes.7 4 It is stated that these purposes are not exhaustive; nor
apparently is one limited to them. They do, however, provide coun-
sel an invaluable aid. One adhering to the above purposes and
stating expressly in the agreement that such is the purpose, should
be relatively assured of not having it invalidated on the ground
that it invades the powers of the board of directors.
It is not without cost to the shareholders or other parties to
the agreement that approval of informal conduct of corporate
affairs and agreement for shareholder management is made. The
effect is the same as where there is a vote pooling agreement: it im-
poses on the shareholders who are parties, the liability for manager-
ial acts or omissions imposed by law on directors. 75 So also, where
74. Id.
75. Id. § 1381. In Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 224
A.2d 634 (1966) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set forth the test of
a director's liability prior to the 1968 Amendments:
Section 408, of the Business Corporation Law of 1933 provides
"Officers and directors of a business corporation shall be deemed to
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation, and shall discharge
the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with dili-
gence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise
under similar circumstances in their personal affairs." This statute
mandates a standard of care for directors much more stringent and
harsh than the standard enunciated by our courts prior to the pas-
sage of the statute.
Id. at 573-574, 224 A.2d at 640. Note, 71 DIcK. L. REV. 668 (1967). By the
1968 Amendments in § 408, the words "in their personal affairs" were
there is in the articles a provision that the business and affairs shall
be managed by the shareholders; then, even without an express
agreement, the shareholders shall be subject to all liabilities im-
posed by law.76 Section 382 (2),77 however, which provides "unless
the context clearly requires otherwise" shareholders shall be
deemed to be directors, is still a means by which it may be shown
that shareholders will not be liable as a director for acts out of
context.
E. Dissolution, Deadlock and Provisional Directors
The amendments provide for both voluntary and involuntary
dissolution of the close corporation. In most closely held corpora-
tions there is no ready market for the stock. A minority share-
holder with no right to dissolution, faced with dissention or dead-
lock over payment of dividends or raising of salaries, may find his
investment worthless, his assets frozen. Under prior law, provision
was made for voluntary dissolution but a written agreement was
required signed by all the shareholders of record consenting to
dissolution or, alternatively, a board of directors resolution ap-
proved by a majority of the outstanding shares of each class en-
titled to vote.7 8  Section 38611 simplifies the procedure for volun-
tary dissolution: any shareholder may, if provided in the articles,
exercise an option to dissolve at will. After written notice of the
exercise of this option is given to the other shareholders, the burden
shifts to them to stop the dissolution. Otherwise, at the end of
thirty days following the sending of the notice the dissolution shall
proceed as if either all shareholders consented or a majority of
shareholders entitled to vote have approved a board of director's
resolution."0 There is absent in the amendments a provision for a
challenge to this "at will" dissolution. Thus, after due notice is
given and the expiration of thirty days, the dissolution shall pro-
ceed.
As long as all the shareholders agree to liquidate, no grounds
need be laid for the "at will" or consent-type of winding up of the
corporation. Where there is an attempt at involuntary dissolution
grounds for a court order still need to be proved before dissolution.
The typical case of involuntary dissolution is where there is a
"deadlock." Section 383A(1) 8 ' sets forth the test for "deadlock:"
The business and affairs of the corporation are managed
by the shareholders and they are so divided that the busi-
omitted. Whether this lowers the director or shareholders' liability must
await court decision.
76. 1968 Amendments § 1382(3). For the liability of corporate direc-
tors and officers, see Howell v. McCloskey, 375 Pa. 100, 99 A.2d 610 (1953);
Rivoli Theatre Company v. Allison, 396 Pa. 343, 152 A.2d 449 (1959).
77. 1968 Amendments § 1382(2).
78. BCL § 2102.
79. 1968 Amendments § 1386.
80. Id. See the alternative remedy at note 83 infra.
81. Id. § 1383A(1).
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ness of the corporation is suffering or is threatened with
irreparable injury and any remedy with respect to
such deadlock provided in the articles or by-laws or in any
written agreement of the shareholders has failed.1
2
Where there is deadlock, a court may be petitioned to appoint a
custodian, or if the corporation is insolvent, a receiver.8 3
Often it is sought not to have the corporation dissolved, but
instead only a means by which director dissention may be resolved
without permanent alteration in the corporate structure or dis-
ruption of the business. Section 38484 provides an alternative stat-
utory remedy: the appointment of a provisional director by
petition to the court of common pleas. For this remedy to be
available in a deadlocked situation the directors do not have to be
evenly divided. Rather they need only be "so divided respecting
the management of the business . . . that . . . [the] affairs of
the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the
shareholders generally."8 15 The result is arbitration. If the dis-
sention cannot be eliminated apparently the provisional director
with all the rights and powers of a duly elected director stays on
indefinitely to over-come the deadlock until either removed by a
majority of the voting shareholders 86 or by court order.
The provisional director remedy is new to Pennsylvania and
no cases have considered it. In California which has a similar
statutory provision, an appellate court sustained a trial court's
appointment of a provisional director. 7 The board was deadlocked
over whether to increase the dividends and reduce a bonus paid
to the corporation's president and general manager. The board
had attempted to elect new officers but when the votes were cast it
was a tie and the incumbents retained their office. After consider-
ing the possibility of the corporation's being subjected to tax lia-
bilities through unreasonable accumulation of earnings through fail-
ure to declare dividends, the disagreement of the directors on the
president's compensation, and allegedly excessive rent of the cor-
poration on realty belonging to the president's wife the court stated:
It is apparent that the remedy afforded by Corpora-
tions Code, Section 819 [for court appointment of a pro-
visional director] is one which is available in situations
82. Id.
83. Id. § 1383A. This same remedy is also available where there is
a right to an "at will" dissolution.
84. Id. § 1384.
85. Id. § 1384A.
86. Id. § 1384C.
87. In re Jamison Steel Corp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 27, 322 P.2d 246
(Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1958). See 2 O'NFAL, § 9.30 (Supp. 1968).
which have not yet reached the point that a receiver should
or could be appointed. It is a less severe remedy which is
available to protect the rights of parties and does not re-
flect upon the financial standing or good name of the
corporation nor does it take the property out of the hands
of the owners or the persons actually administering its
business to advantage or being in danger of impairing and
losing its property and a corporation which is in danger of
cessation or diminution of operations. The facts recited in
this opinion may well be taken as a model for the facts
which will justify the invoking of the remedy provided by
Corporations Code, Section 819.88
There may be situations where the appointment of a provisional
director will solve an impasse. In others, such a remedy may only
be a temporary measure: "[T] he matrix of the deadlock may be
the incompatibility of the principals or of their ideas; and in this
situation the provisional director may only postpone the day when
more drastic remedies must be invoked."
89
F. Termination of Close Corporation Status
In order to enjoy close corporation status the corporation must
continue to meet the requirements of section 372. Chapter B has
termination provisions for situations where either the corporation
wishes to voluntarily terminate its status as, for example, when it
wants to "go public", or, where the corporation does not wish to
terminate its status but the requirements are involuntarily
breached, as when there is a transfer of stock to more than 30
shareholders.
As to voluntary termination, section 37690 provides that a close
corporation may terminate its status by amending its articles to
delete therefrom the section 372 provisions. The deletion amend-
ment must be approved by two-thirds of the votes of the share-
holders entitled to vote. This is true regardless of any limitation
in the articles on voting rights and even though the articles may
require a greater percentage.
Section 378,91 on the other hand, applies to situations where
there has been an involuntary breach in section 372 requirements.
If a condition has been breached the status of the business corpora-
tion as a close corporation ends.9 2 The language of section 378
would appear to admit of no conditions; the mere existence of the
breach forfeits close corporation status. But the close corporation
still has a 30-day option after it has discovered the involuntary
breach in which to take steps to correct the breach. If correction
88. In re Jamison Steel Corp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 27, 34, 322 P.2d 246, 251
(Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1958).
89. Note, 1966 DUKE L. REV. 953 (1966).
90. 1968 Amendments § 1376.
91. Id. § 1378.
92. Id. § 1378A.
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is possible the close corporation retains its status. 93 The termination
provisions of the close corporation perhaps answer one possible
reason for a previous failure to enact specific statutory close cor-
poration measures: the fear that separate legislation would impede
the growth of close corporations and hinder the gradual evolution
of more successful closely-held enterprises into public-issue cor-
porations.9 4 Any close corporation should, under sections 376 and
378, find the transition to a public-issue corporation made with
smoothness and ease.
CONCLUSION
The statutory recognition that a closely-held private corpora-
tion is different in nature from a publicly-held corporation neces-
sitating different statutory treatment is needed and welcome. It
should result in less sham and fancy footwork on the part of coun-
sel attempting to stay within the letter of the law while meeting
the needs of their closely-held corporation clients. While the pre-
1968 language of the BCL was sufficiently flexible to allow the
close corporation to live under it, much of its flexibility was court
derived.
Enacting chapter B to article III is another step toward making
the corporate form increasingly attractive to pragmatic business-
men. One possible result is an increase in the number of partner-
ships, joint ventures, and associations choosing the corporate form.
Any attorney advising his clients both as to the form and con-
duct of business ventures should not overlook the possible ad-
vantages available to a statutory close corporation as outlined in
the 1968 Amendments to the BCL. The Pennsylvania legislature,
by all appearances, has approved serving corporate cake with part-
nership frosting.
PETER F. STUART
93. Id. § 1378A (1) and (2). Query whether an involuntary transfer of
stock which would result in a breach of close corporation status should be
treated as an over issue thus making the directors or in the appropriate
case the shareholders liable for loss? See Loan Soc'y v. Eavenson, 248
Pa. 407, 94 A. 121 (1915).
94. See 1 O'NEAL § 1.11 (Supp. 1968).
